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freed after being held captive for nearly ten years at a home in
Cleveland, Ohio under shockingly inhumane conditions. Subsequent
reports indicated that neighbors claimed to have made several calls to
police over the years regarding suspicious activities at the property
where the women were held by the perpetrator of the kidnappings. Not
surprisingly, the adequacy of Cleveland police investigations into these
reports has been called into question. This has raised speculation over
whether the police can or should be held accountable in some way in the
event that their response is found to be deficient. As my Article
demonstrates, two U.S. Supreme Court cases involving tragically similar
situations indicate that it is highly unlikely Cleveland police will ever
face repercussions even if they are found to have ignored neighbors’
reports or to have otherwise acted negligently. Although the cases
analyzed in this Article were decided in 1989 and 2005, the horrific
circumstances of the Cleveland kidnapping case demonstrate that,
unfortunately, the issues discussed in this Article continue to be all too
salient.
I. INTRODUCTION
James Madison famously wrote: “If men were angels, no
government would be necessary.” 1 The United States, like other
countries, provides its citizens with many benefits such as public schools
and roads in exchange for citizens’ tax contributions. Madison’s
statement, however, reflects the belief that most of these benefits, while
desirable, were not the impetus for the creation of government. Rather,
governments are created when people determine that they are unable to
effectively protect themselves and their rights individually. 2 After all,
were there no government-provided police services, any security would
have to be provided by individuals themselves or by hiring private
security forces. 3 Without the consistent and uniform law enforcement
1. JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO.51 288 (Barnes & Noble Classics ed. 2006).
2. See discussion infra Part IV.
3. At the time the U.S. Constitution was ratified, no official police forces existed as
Americans know them today, and the Constitution itself did not specifically address the creation of
police forces. See Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 685, 688-89
(2001). The concept of law enforcement to protect individual rights, however, was nonetheless
clear to the Founding Fathers:
The Constitution contains no explicit provisions for criminal law enforcement. Nor did
the constitutions of any of the several states contain such provisions at the time of the
Founding. Early constitutions enunciated the intention that law enforcement was a universal duty that each person owed to the community, rather than a power of government.
Founding-era constitutions addressed law enforcement from the standpoint of individual
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standards of a government, the risk of a “might makes right” society
emerges. Moreover, many would argue that fundamental fairness
dictates that an individual’s safety should not be dependent solely on his
or her ability to pay for it. 4 By forming government and spreading the
costs of police forces via taxation, the goals of personal safety and
fairness are both reached. 5 Even staunchly conservative critics of “big
government” tend to agree with the proposition that protecting citizens’
rights is a legitimate function of government. 6
Although the purpose of forming government may have been to
ensure that citizens’ rights would be protected, the United States
Supreme Court has decided two cases that have severely undermined
this seemingly obvious point: DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services 7 and Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales. 8
Although the plaintiffs’ legal claims in the two cases differed, both
involved citizens who begged for help from government officials when
lives were at stake. In both cases, state officials effectively ignored the
pleas. And, in both cases, the results were tragic. The plaintiffs in these
cases sued state officials for their failure to enforce laws designed to
protect people in the plaintiffs’ situations. The Supreme Court rejected
liberties and placed explicit barriers upon the state.
Id. In modern times, government-provided police services are integral to ensuring the security
citizens expect.
4. For an alternative argument—that only private enterprise should be involved in the
provision of personal security and that this would actually help the poor by leading to better, more
efficient outcomes—see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN
MANIFESTO 241–248 (Collier Books 2002) (1973); Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free
Society: Part One—Power vs. Liberty, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 50 (1985) [hereinafter Barnett, Part
One]; Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part Two—Crime Prevention and the
Legal Order, 5 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 30 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, Part Two].
5. The efficacy of the public provision of police forces has been disputed. See ROTHBARD,
supra note 4; Barnett, Part One, supra note 4; Barnett, Part Two, supra note 4.
6. For example, the often controversial Glenn Beck invited on his Fox News television
program, in his words, “[one] of the Constitution’s staunchest defenders . . . author and historian
David Barton” to discuss the birth of the Constitution. Glenn Beck: Restoring the Constitution (Fox
News television broadcast Dec. 21, 2010). Barton discussed Thomas Jefferson’s first inaugural
address, in which Jefferson explained the purpose of the federal government. Barton stated,
“[Jefferson] said [one purpose is] to restrain injury. Government exists to keep the bad guys under
control. It’s not to regulate the good guys. It’s to keep bad guys from hurting somebody.” Id. See
also Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), in 33 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 148, 148–52 (Barbara B. Oberg, ed., Princeton University Press 2006), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~tjpapers/inaugural/infinal.html (“[W]hat more is necessary to make us a
happy and a prosperous people? Still one thing more, fellow citizens, a wise and frugal
government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to
regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement . . . .”).
7. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
8. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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both plaintiffs’ claims, purportedly applying classical liberal
jurisprudence to analyze the claims. Taken together, the two cases hold
that citizens have no constitutional right to police protection from
criminal acts by other private citizens. Even though the State cannot
deny police protection to certain citizens based on factors such as race,
as long as there is no Equal Protection violation, the State has no
obligation to enforce its own laws. 9
This Article will first examine the Court’s holdings in these two
cases and the preexisting legal doctrines that the Court used in its
analyses. The Court, and various legal scholars, believed that its
holdings were firmly grounded in classical liberal or individualist
principles. 10 As will be seen, this seems accurate at first glance, but a
deeper exploration of the classical liberal view of the purpose of
government and the unique nature of police protection as a governmentprovided service shows that the Court was mistaken. In fact, what
purports to be a sound application of classical liberal theory was a
substantial deviation from what a classical liberal analysis of the issue
would yield.
In addition, this Article will also discuss how the dissenting judges
on the Court would have applied already-existing doctrine to each case
to reach the opposite result. However, even if the dissenters had had
their way, their holdings still would not have gone far enough. As will
be shown, both dissenting opinions were narrowly tailored to the
specific facts in each case. This Article contends more broadly that all
citizens have a constitutional right to police protection from criminal
acts by other private citizens.
Finally, this Article will discuss a few possible solutions proposed
by legal scholars in the wake of DeShaney and Castle Rock. It will also
explore whether existing legal doctrine could be applied in such a way as
to achieve the right to police protection for all citizens. Ultimately, the
Article will analyze these opinions from a classical liberal viewpoint and
will find that this viewpoint is compatible with a constitutional right to
police protection. It will be shown that the Court’s contrary holdings in
DeShaney and Castle Rock resulted from a significant logical flaw in the
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This Article focuses on the reasoning supporting the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions in DeShaney and Castle Rock. The applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause, though important, is beyond the scope of this Article.
10. Although the nuances of classical liberal theory are many and are subject to debate, Judge
Richard A. Posner presents a thought-provoking case for the modern application of classical liberal
theory in Pragmatic Liberalism Versus Classic Liberalism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (2004). This
Article does not endeavor to determine the extent to which modern libertarianism is informed by
classical liberalist principles, though undoubtedly the two philosophies overlap.
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Court’s reasoning. An examination of this flaw will further serve to
demonstrate the unique status of police protection as a substantive right
for all citizens.
II. THE CASES
A.

The Claims: Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due Process

Before discussing the cases in detail, it is important to distinguish
the claims brought by the parties. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that citizens have a right to be
protected against State deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. 11 Joshua DeShaney’s claim was that the State
deprived him of his liberty interest in “free[dom] from . . . unjustified
intrusions on personal security” because it failed to protect him from his
father’s abuse. 12 Joshua’s claim was a substantive due process claim. 13
Substantive due process considers whether the government had an
adequate reason for its deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 14 Not
only must the procedures be appropriate to deprive a person of the right,
the government must also be justified in taking the action itself. 15
Joshua’s substantive due process claim, as described by the Court in
DeShaney, alleged that the State “was categorically obligated to protect
him in these circumstances.” 16
Notably, the DeShaney Court stated in a footnote: “Petitioners also
argue that [state law gave Joshua] an ‘entitlement’ to receive protective
services . . . which would enjoy due process protection against state
deprivation under our decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth.” 17 Evidently, though, this issue was first raised in the petitioners’
brief to the Supreme Court; therefore, the Court declined to consider the
issue. 18 The Court did, however, have the opportunity to consider this
issue in Jessica Gonzales’s case. 19 In Castle Rock, Jessica Gonzales

11. Id. at § 1.
12. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 194–95.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142 (3rd Cir. 2000); Madden v. City
of Meriden, 602 F.Supp. 1160, 1167-68 (D. Conn. 1985) (discussing the distinction between
substantive due process and procedural due process).
15. Id.
16. 489 U.S. at 195.
17. Id. at 195 n.2 (citation omitted).
18. Id.
19. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 754.
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brought a procedural due process claim. 20 Procedural due process
claims essentially allege that the government has failed to provide
adequate notice or hearing before taking action that might deprive the
claimant of life, liberty, or property. 21 In general, procedural due
process claims require that the government has undertaken to provide a
benefit (an “entitlement”) on which the claimant relies. 22 Entitlements
have been found in welfare benefits, disability benefits, public
education, utility services, and government employment. 23 Although a
person may not have a categorical right to any of these “entitlements,”
the government may not deprive a person of them without proper
procedural due process once it has undertaken to provide them in the
first place. 24
With this background on the legal claims at issue before the
Supreme Court in DeShaney and Castle Rock, the two cases can now be
discussed in further detail.
B.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services
1. Background: Joshua DeShaney Argues for a Right to Be
Protected from his Father’s Abuse

As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote near the beginning of his opinion
in DeShaney, “[t]he facts of this case are undeniably tragic.” 25 Joshua
DeShaney was only one year old when his parents divorced in 1980, and
a Wyoming court awarded custody of him to his father. 26 Joshua’s
father moved to Winnebago County, Wisconsin with Joshua. 27 His
father remarried, and in January of 1982, his father’s second wife
contacted police in Winnebago County to report that Joshua was being
abused. 28 She told police that the father had “hit the boy causing marks
and [was] a prime case for child abuse.” 29 In Wisconsin, all reports of
child abuse were channeled to the Department of Social Services
(“DSS”) for investigation; in fact, police were only to intervene if the
20.
21.
2006).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545 (3d ed.
See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 789–90.
Id.
Id.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192.
Id. (alteration in original).
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person reporting abuse had concern for the child’s immediate safety. 30
After receiving the report, DSS interviewed Joshua’s father. 31 When he
denied abusing Joshua, DSS did nothing to follow up on the case. 32
About a year later, in January 1983, Joshua was admitted to a local
hospital with injuries that made his doctor suspect child abuse and report
the case to DSS. 33 DSS ordered that Joshua temporarily be kept in the
custody of the hospital, and three days later assembled a team of “a
pediatrician, a psychologist, a police detective, the county’s lawyer,
several DSS caseworkers, and various hospital personnel” who
determined that there was insufficient evidence to keep Joshua from his
father’s custody. 34 Pursuant to the team’s recommendation, Joshua was
released to his father based on several conditions his father promised to
follow. 35 Just one month later, emergency room personnel contacted the
DSS caseworker assigned to Joshua’s case to report that, once again, he
had been brought in with suspicious injuries. 36 The caseworker took no
action other than to make monthly visits to Joshua’s house. 37 During
visits, the caseworker kept notes indicating that Joshua’s father had not
been complying with some of the conditions of his custody, including
the requirement that he enroll Joshua in preschool. 38 The caseworker’s
notes also reflected continuing evidence of injuries to Joshua and her
suspicion that Joshua was being abused by his father. 39 Nothing more
than “dutifully record[ing]” these observations was done for Joshua. 40
In November 1983, the emergency room yet again contacted Joshua’s
caseworker about suspected child abuse. 41 DSS took no action, even
after Joshua’s father told the caseworker on two subsequent home visits
that Joshua was too “sick” to see her. 42
In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat his four-year-old son into a
life-threatening coma. 43 Joshua survived, but because of severe brain

30. Id. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 192.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. These conditions included enrolling Joshua in preschool, receiving counseling, and
“encouraging” his girlfriend to move out of the home. Id.
36. Id. at 192.
37. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
38. Id. at 193.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 193.
43. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
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damage, doctors predicted he would spend the rest of his life
institutionalized in a facility for people with severe mental disabilities.44
Joshua and his mother sued Winnebago County, DSS, and several
individual DSS employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 45 alleging that the
defendants violated Joshua’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. 46 In essence, Joshua and his mother claimed that
DSS deprived Joshua of his liberty interest without due process of law
when it failed to protect him from his father’s abuse. 47
The district court granted summary judgment for DSS and the other
defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the government is not required to protect its
citizens from “private violence” and that there was an insufficient causal
connection between DSS’s conduct and Joshua’s injuries. 48 With its
holding, the Seventh Circuit rejected reasoning used by the Third Circuit
in its opinion in Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 49 which held
that a “special relationship” can arise between a state and a child if the
state learns the child is in danger of abuse and takes on the obligation to
protect the child. 50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in DeShaney
to resolve the apparent circuit split.51
2. Majority Opinion: Joshua DeShaney Had No Substantive Due
Process Right to be Protected from His Father
After the description of the facts of the case and brief discussion of
due process doctrine, the Court got right to the point: “[N]othing in the
language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors.” 52 The Court discussed the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and characterized it, like the Fifth Amendment, as
stemming from concerns about the arbitrary exercise of government
power and a desire to protect people from the State. 53 Regarding the
44. Id.
45. This statute created a federal cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
46. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 193–94 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 812 F.2d 298,
301 (7th Cir. 1987)).
49. 768 F.2d 503 (3rd Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 510-511.
51. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 195–96.
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State protecting citizens from each other, the Court stated that “[t]he
Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in
the latter area to the democratic political process.” 54
The Court then described its due process jurisprudence by citing
cases that held that the Due Process Clauses “generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government may not deprive the individual.” 55 “Although the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against
unwarranted government interference . . . it does not confer an
entitlement to such [governmental aid] as may be necessary to realize all
the advantages of that freedom.” 56
After finding that, generally, a State’s failure to protect a citizen
from private violence does not violate the Due Process Clause, the Court
addressed and rejected the “special relationship” exception adopted by
the Third Circuit. 57 The Court noted that in some situations, when the
State itself deprives a person of the ability to care for himself,
affirmative duties to protect the citizen may be imposed. 58 These
“custody-based” cases hold that when a state exercises affirmative power
to restrain an individual, substantive due process is violated if the State
fails to provide for the basic human needs the individual cannot provide
for himself. 59 This doctrine has been applied to require states to provide
medical care to prisoners,60 services to ensure the “reasonable safety” of
involuntarily committed mental patients,61 and medical care to suspects
in police custody who were injured while being apprehended.62 In these
cases, the State’s initial deprivation of liberty triggered the Due Process
Clause; in Joshua’s case, the harms he suffered did not occur while he
was in State custody. 63 From here, the Court’s argument emphasizes
that Joshua’s father, not the State, beat Joshua and that the State’s

54. Id. at 196. It is unclear whether the “Framers” referred to here are the framers of the Fifth
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment because the Court discusses both amendments before
concluding with the sentence quoted in the text. Regardless, the Court cites no support for this
proposition and, as this Article will attempt to show, the Court’s assertion is dubious at best. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 196 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980)) (alteration in original).
57. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-98.
58. Id. at 198.
59. Id. at 200.
60. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
61. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
62. See Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
63. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
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actions did not actively worsen Joshua’s circumstances. 64 The Court
summed up its opinion by suggesting that perhaps state tort law could
provide a remedy for Joshua and by restating that, although the Court
might feel sympathetic toward the parties in the case, “the harm was
inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua’s father.” 65
3. Dissenting Opinions: The Majority’s Focus on the State’s
Inaction Ignores the Acts the State Did Take
Justice Brennan filed a dissent with which two other justices
joined. 66 The dissent criticized the majority primarily for focusing on
DSS’s inaction and for failing to consider the affirmative acts the State
took with regard to Joshua’s situation. 67 The dissenting judges agreed
with the majority that “the Due Process Clause . . . creates no general
right to basic government services[,]” but believed this was not the issue
to be decided in the case. 68 “No one, in short, has asked the Court to
proclaim that, as a general matter, the Constitution safeguards positive as
well as negative liberties.” 69 These statements, echoing the majority’s
reliance on negative and positive rights, demonstrate that the justices on
both sides of the opinion took the majority’s characterization of police
protection as merely a type of governmental “aid” for granted. In Castle
Rock, the Court elaborated on this theme. 70 These assumptions—and the
classical liberal foundations they purportedly rest on—may be subject to
some debate. 71
The dissenting judges would have focused on Wisconsin’s statutory
child-welfare framework, which required all reports of child abuse to be
channeled to DSS and which imposed a duty on DSS to investigate
them. 72 The law “invite[d]—indeed, direct[ed]—citizens and other
governmental entities to depend on [DSS] to protect children from

64. See id. at 201.
65. Id. at 201-203.
66. Id. at 203. The two other justices were Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun. Id.
67. “‘The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case,’ the Court today
concludes, ‘is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more
active role for them.’” Id.
68. Id. at 203–04.
69. Id. at 204. The dissent further stated, “The Court’s baseline is the absence of positive
rights in the Constitution and a concomitant suspicion of any claim that seems to depend on such
rights.” Id.
70. See infra, Section II.C.2.
71. See infra, Section IV.
72. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208.
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abuse.” 73 Through the State’s affirmative act creating its system of child
protection, the State intervened in Joshua’s life and effectively confined
him to his father’s home because DSS alone was in charge of handling
Joshua’s case. 74 Because “[u]nfortunately for Joshua . . . the buck
effectively stopped with [DSS,]” the dissenting judges believed the case
should have been analyzed under the Court’s custody-based precedent,
wherein positive duties may be imposed upon the State.75 The dissent
compared Joshua’s case with Youngberg v. Romeo, 76 a case in which the
Court held that the State had a duty to provide minimum safety levels
when confining an individual to a psychiatric hospital. 77 The majority in
DeShaney believed that the holding in Romeo resulted because the
State’s institutionalization of Romeo restricted his freedom to act on his
own behalf. 78 In contrast, the dissenting judges in DeShaney believed
that the holding in Romeo resulted because Romeo’s institutionalization
separated him from other sources of help. 79 The dissent made the point
that the majority’s restatement of the holding was highly questionable
considering that Romeo had never been capable of acting on his own
behalf—even as an adult, he had the mental capacity of an eighteenmonth-old child. 80
Applying this interpretation of Romeo in DeShaney, the dissent
would have held that, because Wisconsin law cut off all other avenues of
assistance for Joshua, the State would have owed him a duty to protect
him from abuse once it became aware that the abuse was occurring. 81
“Today’s opinion construes the Due Process Clause to permit a State to
displace private sources of protection and then, at the critical moment, to
shrug its shoulders and turn away from the harm that it has promised to
try to prevent.” 82 The point the Court made here is critical and reflects
an insight into the unique status of police protection that has been
alluded to throughout this Article. The question is whether only specific
statutory schemes displace private protection or whether the public
provision of law enforcement does that by its very nature.
Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissent, which, although perhaps
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 210.
See id. at 209.
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205-206.
Id. at 205-206.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 212.
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not as thoroughly reasoned as the other two opinions, was a more natural
reaction to the facts of this case. 83 Justice Blackmun denounced the
majority’s “formalistic reasoning” of the Fourteenth Amendment: “Poor
Joshua! . . . abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous
predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did
essentially nothing . . . .” 84 Justice Blackmun’s strikingly emotional
reaction should be thoughtfully considered. The majority took great
pains to avoid “yielding to the impulse” of “natural sympathy” for
Joshua and his mother.85 Some commentators have seized upon this
unfortunate language in the majority opinion to criticize the individualist
or classical liberal theory for too strongly embracing the formalism
denounced by Justice Blackmun. 86 As will be discussed, however, the
natural sympathies expressed by Justice Blackmun and felt by most who
know of Joshua DeShaney’s case need not be ignored.
C. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
1. Background: Jessica Gonzales Sues Police for Violating Her
Due Process Rights by Failing to Enforce a Restraining Order
Against Her Husband
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court tackled the
issue it had declined to address in DeShaney: whether the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due process made law
enforcement a protected property right. 87 Jessica Gonzales, the plaintiff
in the original case (respondent on appeal to the Supreme Court), had
obtained a state-law restraining order. 88 She alleged that having the
police enforce that order was a constitutionally protected property
interest. 89
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began the Court’s opinion
like Justice Rehnquist did in DeShaney by acknowledging that the facts
in the case were “horrible.” 90 During the process of her divorce, a state
83. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212.
84. Id. at 213.
85. Id. at 202–03.
86. See, e.g., Laura Oren, The State’s Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due
Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 698 (1990).
87. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 750–51. The Court specifically stated that, although DeShaney
resolved the issue of whether substantive due process requires a state to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens, the issue of procedural due process was left unanswered. See id. at 755.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 751.
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trial court granted Mrs. Gonzales a temporary restraining order against
her husband. 91 The order required her husband to stay one hundred
yards from the family home at all times and to refrain from “molest[ing]
or disturb[ing] the peace of [Mrs. Gonzales] or of any child.” 92 The
order was later modified and made permanent by the trial court, though
it allowed Mr. Gonzales limited visitation rights with his children as
long as arrangements were made with Mrs. Gonzales. 93
On June 22, 1999, without making the required advance
arrangements, Mr. Gonzales took the couple’s three daughters from the
front yard of the family home. 94 When Mrs. Gonzales discovered her
children were missing, she immediately suspected her husband and
called the Castle Rock Police Department (“Police”) at 7:30 p.m. 95
Although two officers were dispatched and Mrs. Gonzales showed them
her restraining order, the officers merely told her to call the Police again
if her daughters weren’t home by 10:00 p.m. 96 At 8:30 p.m., Mrs.
Gonzales reached her husband on his cell phone, and he claimed he had
taken the children to an amusement park. 97 Mrs. Gonzales reported this
to the Police, but she was again told to wait until 10:00 p.m. 98
At 10:10 p.m., Mr. Gonzales and the children were still missing. 99
Mrs. Gonzales called the Police and this time was told to wait until
midnight. 100 She then went to see if anyone was at her husband’s
apartment and found it empty. 101 She called the Police from his
apartment at 12:10 a.m. and was told an officer would be sent over.102
No one came. 103 At 12:50 a.m., Mrs. Gonzales went to the police station
and filed a report. 104 Instead of taking steps to enforce the restraining
order or to search for the missing children, the officer with whom Mrs.
Gonzales spoke went to dinner. 105
Mr. Gonzales showed up at the police station at 3:20 a.m. with a

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 751.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 754.
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semiautomatic handgun he had purchased earlier in the evening. 106
When he opened fire on the police station, police officers shot back and
killed him. 107 Mr. Gonzales had already murdered his children, and their
bodies were found in the trunk of his car. 108
Mrs. Gonzales brought an action against the Town of Castle Rock,
alleging that it had violated the Due Process Clause because the police
department had an official policy of failing to enforce restraining
orders. 109 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that Mrs. Gonzales did not
have a cognizable substantive due process claim but found that she had
stated a claim for violation of procedural due process. 110
2. Majority Opinion: Enforcement of a Restraining Order is Not a
Constitutionally Protected Property Interest
The Supreme Court determined that it would decide the “ultimate
issue” of whether Mrs. Gonzales’ restraining order constituted a property
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. 111 First, the Court noted that
not all benefits rise to the level of property interests. 112 A person must
have a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the benefit and not merely
“an abstract need or desire” or “a unilateral expectation” of it.113 The
Constitution itself does not create these entitlements; they are created
and defined by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.” 114 Benefits may not be protected
entitlements if they may be granted or denied at the government’s
discretion. 115 The Tenth Circuit had held that the language of the
restraining order mandated enforcement by police in the event that
police had probable cause to believe the order had been violated. 116 This
106. Id.
107. Id. at 754.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Court noted that three police officers were also named as defendants, but the
Court of Appeals decided that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. Mrs. Gonzales did not
appeal this ruling. Id.
110. Id. (citing Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2002)).
111. Id. at 756. Because state law, and not the Constitution, creates the property rights that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects, Mrs. Gonzales urged the Court to defer to the Tenth Circuit’s
holding. Id. The Court noted that it has applied a presumption of deference to the views of federal
courts on state law within the federal courts’ jurisdiction but that this presumption may be
overcome. Id. at 757.
112. Id. at 756.
113. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
114. Id. at 756 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976)).
115. Id. (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1976)).
116. Id.
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was based on a preprinted notice describing the duties of the police
under the statute stating that an officer “shall use every reasonable
means to enforce a restraining order” and that upon probable cause that
the order has been violated, an officer “shall arrest, or, if an arrest would
be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant [for arrest.]” 117
Despite the ostensibly mandatory language of the order, the Court
held that because of the “deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement
discretion[,]” the provisions of Colorado law did not make enforcement
mandatory. 118 The Court went on to note that most mandatory arrest
statutes (usually in the context of domestic violence complaints) had
been held to be impossible to follow in situations where the offender was
not on the scene. 119 Because Mr. Gonzales’ whereabouts were
unknown, he could not be arrested. 120 Therefore, any mandatory duty
imposed would be a duty to investigate, which would be so open-ended
as to scope and duration as to be totally impractical.121 According to the
Court, because Mrs. Gonzales did not precisely state the means of
enforcement she believed she was entitled to, the benefit she claimed
could not rise to the level of an entitlement. 122 The Court went on to
state that, even if the statute did require mandatory enforcement, this
would not necessarily be the equivalent of an entitlement conferred on a
specific class of people. 123 Criminal law generally serves public, not
private, ends. 124 Overall, on this issue, the Court stated, “We conclude
that Colorado has not created such an entitlement.” 125
Next, the Court questioned whether enforcement could be an
entitlement even if it were deemed mandatory. 126 Notably, the Court
stated, “Perhaps most radically, the alleged property interest here arises
incidentally, not out of some new species of government benefit or
service, but out of a function that government actors have always
performed—to wit, arresting people who they have probable cause to
believe have committed a criminal offense.” 127 Moreover, enforcement
117. Id. at 759.
118. Id. at 761.
119. Id. at 763
120. See id. at 762–63.
121. Id. at 762.
122. Id. at 763.
123. Id. at 764–65.
124. Id. at 764–65. The Court added that, under Colorado law, district attorneys can prosecute
domestic assault even if the victim does not wish to press charges. Id. But see ROTHBARD, supra
note 4, at 55–66.
125. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766.
126. See id. at 766.
127. Id. at 766–767.
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of the restraining order did not have monetary value, as “implicitly
required” in the Court’s prior holdings. 128 Finally, the Court emphasized
that the nature of the benefit was simply too “indirect” to constitute an
entitlement. 129
The Court concluded its opinion by summing up the state of the law
after its present holding and its holding in DeShaney: “[T]he benefit that
a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime
generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause,
neither in its procedural nor in its “substantive” manifestations.” 130 The
Court expressed “reluctance to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as ‘a
font of tort law,’” and, like Justice Rehnquist did in DeShaney, noted
that liability could be imposed under state law. 131
3. Concurring Opinion: Collapsing the Distinction Between
Property Protected and the Process that Protects It
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a concurrence in
which he primarily argued that prior precedent indicated that process
cannot be an end in itself rising to the level of a property interest. 132 In
these justices’ view, the property interest claimed was in itself a variety
of procedures—police investigation and arrest—so Mrs. Gonzales
therefore had not articulated a claim for the deprivation of a recognized
property right. 133 Interestingly, the concurring judges argued that Mrs.
Gonzales’ claim “collaps[ed] the distinction between property protected
and the process that protects it . . . .” 134
The distinction that these justices considered the proper foundation
for a holding against Mrs. Gonzales is more properly viewed as
reasoning supporting a finding in her favor. By combining these
justices’ insight that a right and the provision of that right should be
analyzed separately with the DeShaney Court’s focus on negative and
positive rights, a framework for analysis emerges that provides a
constitutional right to police protection from the violence of private
actors. Moreover, classical liberal theory underlies and justifies this
right.
128. Id. (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885, 964 (2000)).
129. See id. at 767.
130. Id. at 768.
131. Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981)).
132. Id. at 771.
133. Id. at 771–72.
134. Id. at 772.
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4. Dissenting Opinion: The Functional Equivalent of a
Contractual Relationship between Mrs. Gonzales and the State
May Create a Property Interest
Two justices, Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, dissented in
Castle Rock. The dissenting justices agreed with the majority and with
the prior holding in DeShaney that “[i]t is perfectly clear . . . that neither
the Federal Constitution itself, nor any federal statute, granted
respondent or her children any individual entitlement to police
protection.” 135 However, the justices went on to argue that, had Mrs.
Gonzales entered into a contract with a private security firm, the
family’s interest in the contract would “unquestionably constitute
‘property’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.” 136
Interestingly, the majority opinion also went out of its way to distinguish
contracts: “[Mrs. Gonzales’] alleged interest stems only from a State’s
statutory scheme . . . . She does not assert that she has any common-law
or contractual entitlement to enforcement.” 137 The dissenting justices
held that, if Mrs. Gonzales could show that the Colorado statute created
the “functional equivalent” of a contractual relationship, enforcement of
the restraining order could qualify as property. 138 The dissent criticized
the majority for focusing on the “precise means of enforcement” and not
on whether the police had discretion to enforce to begin with. 139 And, as
far as the majority’s opinion that mandatory arrest provisions are
inapplicable when the offender is not on the scene, the dissenters
objected, concluding that this is also an issue of scope. 140 Furthermore,
cases where the offender has left the scene are significantly different
than this one, where Mr. Gonzales had absconded with the children and
was thus in continuous violation of the order. 141
Finally, the dissenting justices rejected the majority’s assertion that
to be a property interest a benefit must be defined specifically. 142 This
explained why property interests had been found in welfare benefits,
135. Id. at 773.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 765.
138. Id. at 773.
139. Id. at 784. Before their analysis of the majority opinion, the dissenting justices expressed
their opinion that the Court should have deferred to the Tenth Circuit’s reading of the Colorado
statute or certified the question to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 778–85. The dissenting
justices also emphasized the unique nature of domestic violence statutes as evidence that the
Colorado legislature intended enforcement of the restraining orders to be mandatory. Id.
140. Id. at 793.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 789.
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disability benefits, public education, utility services, and government
employment. 143 As in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,144 the
law in this case guaranteed a service to a specific class of individuals,
and Mrs. Gonzales reasonably relied on that guarantee. 145 The
dissenting justices would have held that enforcement of the restraining
order was indeed a protected property interest and would have found that
the police deprived Mrs. Gonzales of that property interest without due
process of law.
D.

Public Response to DeShaney and Castle Rock
1. “Poor Joshua!” Indeed

DeShaney and Castle Rock were not popular opinions. Public
opinion was generally unfavorable. One newspaper columnist in 1995,
writing about the recent tragic death of a young girl at the hands of her
abusive mother in New York City, compared the story to Joshua
DeShaney’s case. 146 On the issue of whether the child’s caseworkers,
who had behaved similarly to those in Joshua’s case, could be held
liable, the author wrote: “Is there no redress for the city’s negligence?
The answer, for good or ill, is none at all.” 147 The article concluded:
There’s a difference between law and justice. Justice is what we
deserve; law is what we get. Contrary to popular impression, the
court’s function is not to dispense justice, but to interpret law. As a
matter of constitutional law, Rehnquist was clearly right. As a matter
148
of justice, poor Joshua! And poor Elisa too.

According to this author, we have evidently come rather far from when
James Madison wrote: “Justice is the end of government. It is the end of
civil society.” 149 In a March 1989 newspaper article, a reader replied
that she had read the story of Joshua DeShaney “with a mixture of
sorrow, anger, and disgust.” 150 Her sorrow was for Joshua; her anger
was for the social workers; and her disgust was for the U.S. Supreme
143. Id. at 789–90.
144. 408 U.S. 564.
145. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 790.
146. James J. Kilpatrick, Poor Joshua! Poor Elisa!, POINT PLEASANT REGISTER, Dec. 18,
1995, at 2.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. MADISON, supra note 1, at 291.
150. Frieda Levine, Life of Joshua hurt others, THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, March 10, 1989, at
6A.
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Court. 151
Resounding criticism also followed the Castle Rock case. One
columnist called the decision “infuriating” and called for new laws “to
set right what the court got wrong.” 152 The author bluntly stated,
“Battered women across America have one more reason to cringe.” 153
2. The Legal Community
Legal scholars have advanced various criticisms of the DeShaney
and Castle Rock cases. One author, Professor Laura Oren, traced the
history of child welfare laws in the United States to attempt to show that
“[c]hildren at risk because of parental behavior are treated differently
[under the law] from other citizens in need of protection.” 154 Professor
Oren argued that the Court’s opinion in DeShaney “follow[ed] from an
abstract and general constitutional due process theory and [was] not
responsive to the specific context of child protection.” 155 The Court’s
focus on state custody of an individual (i.e., whether the State has
deprived an individual of his or her ability to care for himself or herself)
cannot reasonably be applied to children, who are always unable to care
for themselves. 156 Professor Oren also sharply criticized the majority’s
reliance on what she characterized as “classical liberalism and the
laissez-faire ethic” as “creat[ing] a false equivalency between people,
predicaments, and liberties that are not truly alike.” 157 Professor Oren
would build on the “special relationship” test by “placing Joshua
DeShaney’s claim back in the full child protection setting from which it
was abstracted by the Court . . . .” 158
Just before Castle Rock was decided, one author, Julie Hilden,
offered some comments on the upcoming case and discussed it in the
context of DeShaney. 159 Although she believed the Court would rule
against Mrs. Gonzales, she argued that DeShaney could be narrowly

151. Id.
152. Errol Louis, Editorial, Disorder in the Court, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, June 28, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 25296126.
153. Id.
154. Oren, supra note 86, at 668.
155. Id. at 683.
156. Id. at 687.
157. Id. at 697–699.
158. Id. at 701.
159. Julie Hilden, Must the Government Protect Its Citizens If It Learns They Are in Danger?
The Supreme Court Considers How Far Responsibility Reaches, FINDLAW (Mar. 29, 2005),
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/hilden/20050329.html.
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overruled only as it applied to children. 160 She cited concerns similar to
Professor Oren’s concerns: “DeShaney’s libertarian logic—suggesting
that private persons can usually take care of themselves, so the
government isn’t responsible when they get hurt—doesn’t make sense
when applied to minors.” 161
Many scholars responded similarly to Castle Rock. 162 One author
argued that the Supreme Court “has elevated the liberty of police
officers to ignore their duties to enforce court ordered restraining orders
over the safety and security of the victims of domestic violence.” 163 Just
as many legal scholars in the wake of DeShaney focused specifically on
the duty to protect in the context of child abuse, many scholars following
Castle Rock focused on the duty to protect in the limited context of
domestic violence. 164
III. REJECTED DOCTRINE
In DeShaney, the Court focused on a custody-based test for
determining when a state has an affirmative duty to act to protect its
citizens’ life, liberty, and property. 165 Only the affirmative act of
confining an individual can trigger affirmative duties in the State. 166 In
Castle Rock, the Court ruled that even providing a restraining order does
160. Id.
161. Id. For another analysis of DeShaney focused primarily on finding an affirmative duty of
care in the context of child abuse, see Amy Sinden, In Search of Affirmative Duties Toward
Children Under a Post-DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1990).
162. See, e.g., Lynn A. Combs, Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Legacy of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 387, 405-08 (2006) (arguing that state legislatures must act to
ensure the protection of domestic violence victims because courts have failed to do so); Sara
Metusalem, Note, Should There Be a Public Duty to Respond to Private Violence? The Effect of
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales on Restraining Orders, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1037, 1057-61 (2007)
(advocating state legislation explicitly mandating the enforcement of restraining orders); Sara B.
Poster, An Unreasonable Constitutional Restraint: Why the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales Rests on Untenable Rationales, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 129,
135-44 (2007) (criticizing, among other things, the Court’s focus on the monetary value of a
claimed property interest and the Court’s application of its own precedent, and urging the Court to
overrule its holding).
163. Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy, The Court’s Assault on New
Property: The Right to the Mandatory Enforcement of a Restraining Order is a “Sham,” “Nullity,”
and “Cruel Deception,” 54 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 331 (2006).
164. See, e.g., Kathleen K. Curtis, Comment, The Supreme Court’s Attack on Domestic
Violence Legislation—Discretion, Entitlement, and Due Process in Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1181 (2006); G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of
Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L. J. 111
(2005).
165. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–201.
166. Id.
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not create a property right in police enforcement of the order. 167 “In
light of today’s decision and that in DeShaney, the benefit that a third
party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime
generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause,
neither in its procedural nor its ‘substantive’ manifestations.” 168 These
holdings declined to adopt any exceptions other than the custody rule.
There were, however, other doctrines that had been applied by lower
federal courts. 169
A.

The Special Relationship Test

In DeShaney, the petitioners urged that, even if the Court were to
reject the notion that the Due Process Clause imposed a duty on the State
to ensure adequate protection for citizens generally, it should
nonetheless adopt a “special relationship” test. 170 The Third Circuit had
adopted this test in Estate of Bailey v. County of York. 171 The facts in
Estate of Bailey were startlingly similar to DeShaney: child protective
services investigated and found evidence of abuse of a five-year-old girl,
Aleta Bailey. 172 Child protective services removed Aleta from the home
shared by Aleta’s mother and her mother’s boyfriend, instructing her
mother that Aleta could come home only if the boyfriend would be
denied access to her. 173 Aleta was returned to her home, but child
protective services made no efforts to determine whether or not the
boyfriend was still living there. 174 A month later, Aleta died from
injuries inflicted by her mother and her mother’s boyfriend. 175
The Third Circuit cited a Fourth Circuit opinion176 and two Seventh
Circuit opinions 177 to support its conclusion that, even in the absence of
state custody, certain circumstances could warrant the imposition of
affirmative duties on the State. 178 The Third Circuit also cited language
167. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey v. Cnty. of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3rd Cir. 1985); Cornelius v.
Town of Highland Lake, Ala., 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), superseded by Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115 (1992); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3rd Cir. 1996).
170. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
171. Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510–11.
172. Id. at 505.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194–96 (4th Cir. 1984).
177. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th
Cir. 1979).
178. Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510.
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in Martinez v. California, 179 a U.S. Supreme Court case, which affirmed
the dismissal of a case seeking damages from a parole board after a
woman was tortured and killed by a parolee five months after his
release. 180 The case was dismissed on proximate cause grounds, but the
Supreme Court in dicta left open the possibility that a special
relationship may exist which imposes affirmative duties on the State in
some cases:
[T]he parole board was not aware that appellants’ decedent, as
distinguished from the public at large, faced any special danger. We
need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never be deemed
to ‘deprive’ someone of life by action taken in connection with the
181
release of a prisoner on parole.

In DeShaney, the Supreme Court discussed the Third Circuit’s
opinion in Estate of Bailey and explained that, under the special
relationship test, when a state undertakes to protect a citizen from a
particular danger, a duty arises to act in a “reasonably competent
fashion.” 182 Essentially, although not every citizen has a right to police
protection, that right may arise once the State steps in and offers
protection. The Supreme Court, however, explicitly rejected the special
relationship test. 183 “The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the
State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 184
B.

The “Special Danger” Test

In Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 185 the Eleventh Circuit
construed DeShaney to indicate that the government may incur an
affirmative duty to protect its citizens if the government itself created the
danger or rendered an individual more vulnerable to harm than he or she

179. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
180. Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510.
181. Id. (quoting Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (emphasis added)).
182. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
183. Id. at 198.
184. Id. at 200 (“In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of
restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the ‘deprivation of
liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his
liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.”).
185. 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989).
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would have been without state intervention. 186 The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that “[t]he [DeShaney] Court also found in denying liability,
that despite the state’s awareness of the child’s dangerous predicament,
the state ‘played no part in [its] creation, nor did it do anything to render
him any more vulnerable to [it].’” 187 In another opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit had held that a special danger may exist if a person can show that
he or she faced a possibility of harm distinguishable from the public at
large. 188 The Eleventh Circuit cited other appellate court opinions
adopting the special danger test. 189 However, the Eleventh Circuit later
held that a 1992 Supreme Court case, Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 190 abrogated the special danger test by holding that only
government conduct “that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or
conscience shocking” can trigger due process claims in the absence of
state custody. 191
C.

The State-Created Danger Test

The Third Circuit has adopted a “state-created danger” test that
incorporates both the special relationship test and special danger test. 192
It requires (1) that the harm was foreseeable and direct, (2) that the state
actors acted with “willful disregard” for a person’s safety, (3) the
existence of a relationship between the state and the injured person, and
(4) that the state actors used their authority to create the possibility of a
crime occurring against the injured person. 193
The state-created danger test imputes a form of accountability onto
the State by imposing a duty to protect a citizen in certain situations if
the State has created the dangerous situation at issue or has otherwise
increased that citizen’s vulnerability to danger. 194 From this perspective,
if the State has acted in a manner that puts a citizen in danger and fails to
protect that citizen from harm, then the State cannot claim a “merely

186. Id. at 356.
187. Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201).
188. Jones v. Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642, 644-645 (11th Cir. 1985).
189. See, e.g., Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 370-371 (8th Cir. 1988); Bowers v. DeVito, 686
F.2d 616, 618-619 (7th Cir. 1982).
190. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
191. White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at
128).
192. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211 (3rd Cir. 1996).
193. Id. at 1208.
194. See Justin M. Rindos, Note, Fallen on Deaf Ears: DeShaney Revisited, 21 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 321, 332-33 (2008).
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passive” role in the citizen’s injury. 195 The Third Circuit’s state-created
danger paradigm has been constructed to be somewhat demanding on the
plaintiff in order to avoid encroaching onto the State’s discretionary
authority in enforcement. 196 The state-created danger test could be seen
as a more narrow or particularized test than the special relationship or
special danger tests taken by themselves. Nonetheless, the state-created
danger test still offers a viable option in the more egregious cases, such
as DeShaney and Castle Rock, involving the State’s outright dereliction
of responsibility.
D.

Existing Doctrine is Insufficient to Establish a Constitutional Right
to Police Protection Against Private Violence for All Citizens

In searching for a way to overturn DeShaney and Castle Rock, it is
tempting simply to advocate for the resurrection of the special
relationship test, the special danger test, or to combine both, as the Third
Circuit did. Some scholarly works criticizing DeShaney and Castle
Rock have done just that. Some critics, for example, have argued that the
special relationship test provides an adequate remedy to persuade the
government to enforce its laws. 197
Both DeShaney and Castle Rock could have been resolved
differently under either the special danger or special relationship test. In
DeShaney, the State created a special relationship with Joshua by
creating a child protective services scheme that was exclusively charged
with protecting children and by undertaking to protect him specifically
by first removing him from and then returning him to his father’s
custody. And, although the Court in DeShaney argued that the State did
not place Joshua in a more dangerous position than he would have been
without State intervention, it still could have found for Joshua under the
special danger test. When the State placed Joshua back in the custody of
his father, it was aware of a special danger that Joshua faced and placed
him in a more dangerous position than he was in when he was in State
custody.
In Castle Rock, had the Court applied the special relationship test, it
195. Id. at 333 (quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)).
196. Id. at 334. See also Chris W. Perhson, Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty.: Putting the Kibosh
on State-Created Danger Claims Alleging State Actor Inaction, 52 VILL. L. REV. 1046, 1063-64
(2007) (discussing the “significant burden on litigants” to satisfy the elements of the Third Circuit’s
state-created danger test).
197. See, e.g., Lisa Snead, Note, Domestic Violence Litigation in the Wake of DeShaney and
Castle Rock, 18 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 305, 317 (2009). State courts may be free to adopt their own
common law causes of action that embrace the special relationship test or special danger test. Id.
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could have found that by granting Mrs. Gonzales a restraining order the
State entered into a special relationship with her and undertook the
affirmative duty to protect her. Moreover, because it had issued a
restraining order, the State was aware of a special danger that Mrs.
Gonzales faced that was distinguishable from the public at large. The
Court, therefore, could have found in her favor under the special danger
test.
Resurrecting either or both of these doctrines could provide a
workable solution that would hold state officials accountable for
egregious behavior like that which occurred in the DeShaney and Castle
Rock cases and may satisfy the public and legal scholars who expressed
outrage over the opinions. But it is not sufficient to simply resurrect old
doctrine. Similarly, adding another exception to current doctrine might
lead to better outcomes than would result under current doctrine alone,
but engrafting this “quick fix” would only serve to perpetuate the
Court’s fundamentally flawed reasoning in DeShaney and Castle Rock
about the nature of law enforcement and rights, the purpose of
government, and the classical liberal underpinnings of this country.
Most significantly, it is important to debunk the custody exception,
which rests on false premises and logical inconsistencies, to explain why
current doctrine is inadequate. Once this is accomplished, the right of
citizens to police protection becomes the presumption rather than the
exception.
IV. FALSE PREMISES
The current doctrine regarding the right of citizens to police
protection is fundamentally flawed in several respects. This section will
first address the problem with the custody exception, currently the only
situation in which affirmative duties are imposed upon the State. Then,
other aspects of the Court’s reasoning in DeShaney and Castle Rock will
be questioned, including dicta in Castle Rock distinguishing Mrs.
Gonzales’ claim from claims founded in contract and the Court’s
reasoning in both opinions relying on the distinction between positive
and negative rights. The final part of this section will discuss the
implications of the Court’s flawed assumptions.
A.

Abolishing the Myth of the Custody Doctrine

Despite the Third Circuit’s creation of the state-created danger test,
under Supreme Court precedent only custody can impose affirmative
duties on a state to protect its citizens. The custody exception rests on
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the distinction between state action and inaction that the majority in
DeShaney drew and that the dissent strongly disputed. 198 According to
the Supreme Court’s rule, only when the State acts by taking a person
into its custody can positive duties of care be imposed on the State.199
Otherwise, as Judge Posner famously stated, “the Constitution is a
charter of negative rather than positive liberties.” 200
The idea that there are any citizens who are not in state custody in
the context of police protection is almost farcical. The custody doctrine
revolves around the idea that the State has undertaken the responsibility
of caring for citizens when it takes them into custody because citizens
can no longer care for themselves. In terms of police protection, in
many instances citizens may not care for themselves; in fact, if they do,
they could face punishment from the State. Although some states have
“citizen’s arrest” provisions, many are strictly limited. 201 Otherwise,
citizens who attempt to use force or detain criminal suspects are often
considered vigilantes.202 Even private security forces, such as security
guards, bodyguards, and bail bondsmen, are typically not granted the
same allowances of force that government police officers are entitled to
use. 203 In practical matters, too, police protection is not as easily
compared to other government benefits as the Court tried to do in both
DeShaney and Castle Rock. As discussed above, citizens have
extremely limited options when it comes to ensuring their own
protection because laws specifically militate against the private use of
force in many instances. Thus, the public’s reliance on government
198. 489 U.S. at 203, 207.
199. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317, 324.
200. Jackson v. City of Joilet, 715 F.2d 1200,1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
201. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 23-582(b) (2001) (requiring that private citizens witness the
commission of a crime in order to be able to make an arrest); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
14.01 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (providing that citizens may arrest only for felony
offenses committed in the citizen’s presence); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22(e) (West, Westlaw
through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (effective July 1, 2010) (providing that a private person may use
reasonable physical force to effect an arrest but is not justified in using deadly force unless in selfdefense). But see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-604 (West, Westlaw through 2013) (providing that a
private person may arrest another for a felony even if not committed in his or her presence); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-13-10 (2013) (allowing citizen’s arrest for felonies upon “certain information that
a felony has been committed”).
202. Criminal charges are not the only consequence, either. Civil penalties may exist for
taking the law “into one’s own hands.” See Alvin Stauber, Citizen’s Arrest: Rights and
Responsibilities, 18 MIDWEST L. REV. 31, 34–35 (2002) (discussing the risk of a false arrest or false
imprisonment claim a retailer takes on when making a citizen’s arrest of a suspected shoplifter).
203. Private security forces are generally governed by citizen’s arrest statutes. See David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1183–84 (1999). Professor Sklansky,
however, argues that the distinction between private and public police forces has become blurred.
See id.
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police forces is even more heightened than public reliance on
government “entitlements” such as education, welfare, or disability
benefits. Even though the government frequently regulates the nature of
private provision of education and assistance to those in financial need,
the government does not prohibit outright the private provision of
education or assistance.
Aside from these practical considerations, State-provided police
protection holds a unique position in terms of rights because of the
ultimate foundation of our government. Both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Castle Rock noted that, had Jessica Gonzales been
able to show a contractual relationship ensuring her protection, the
analysis would have been quite different. What the Court failed to
consider 204 is that our government was founded on the basis of contract
theory. The DeShaney and Castle Rock Courts’ analyses of police
protection in the context of positive and negative rights were flawed and
are actually contrary to the classical liberal foundations of our country.
Furthermore, critics of DeShaney and of Castle Rock who attributed the
holdings in these cases to a reliance on libertarian or “individualist”
principles were also mistaken.
B.

Social Contract Theory

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he most basic function of
any government is to provide for the security of the individual and of his
property.” 205 As one author noted, protection of citizens is “the first
duty of government.” 206 In fact, it is not only government’s first duty; it
is government’s first purpose. John Locke, whose writings largely
influenced the Founding Fathers of our country, explained why people
are willing to form societies even though it may entail ceding certain
rights:
If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be
absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest,

204. Although, in fairness, Mrs. Gonzales did not raise the issue.
205. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)). Justice White’s
dissent continued, “These ends of society are served by the criminal laws which for the most part
are aimed at the prevention of crime. Without the reasonably effective performance of the task of
preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle to talk about human dignity and civilized
values.” Miranda, 284 U.S. at 539.
206. Steven Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L. J. 507, 508 (1991) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was actually
intended to explicitly grant citizens the right to police protection).
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and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom? Why will
he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control
of any other power? To which ‘tis obvious to answer, that though in
the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very
uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others. For all
being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no
strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he
has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. . . . [Man] is willing to
join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to
unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates,
which I call by the general name, property. . . . The great and chief
end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting
207
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.

The Founding Fathers would likely have viewed the proposition
that the primary purpose of government is to ensure its citizens rights as
a statement of the obvious. The Declaration of Independence described
government as a contract between the people and the government which
could be nullified in the event of breach; the Declaration detailed the
way in which the Crown had wronged those living in the colonies and
the ways in which the colonies had attempted to abide by the contract in
the past. 208 The Declaration also claimed the natural rights of the people
and declared “[t]hat to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.” 209 After asserting the right to abolish the government when
it no longer meets these ends, the right of the people was claimed to
institute a new government that would “seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness.” 210
Other statements by the Founding Fathers echo similar sentiments.
“A free government with arbitrary means to administer it is a
contradiction; a free government without adequate provision for personal
security is an absurdity . . . .” 211 “Government is instituted for the
common good; for the protection . . . of the people . . . .” 212 “Why has
government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not

207. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT Ch. IX, § 123 (C.B. McPherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690) (emphasis added).
208. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.2 (U.S. 1776).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. THE QUOTABLE FOUNDING FATHERS 148 (Buckner F. Melton, Jr. ed., 2004) (quoting
Daniel Webster).
212. Id. (quoting John Adams).

2013]

A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO POLICE PROTECTION

65

conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without restraint.” 213 “The
best frame of government is that which is most likely to prevent the
greatest sum of evil.” 214 “Government, in my humble opinion, should be
formed to secure and enlarge the exercise of natural rights of its
members; and every government, which has not this in view, as its
principal object, is not a government of the legitimate kind.” 215
Contrary to the beliefs of commentators who blamed classical
liberal thought for the DeShaney and Castle Rock Courts’ decisions, 216
classical liberalism does not support the Courts’ holdings. According to
one explanation of libertarian thought on rights, “[r]ights are what
individuals bring to politics, not what they take out. When political
society works properly, what individuals derive from politics is security
for rights, but their previously justified rights are what they enter into
political arrangements to secure.” 217 Robert Nozick, another prominent
libertarian scholar, characterized the ideal State this way: “a minimal
state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft,
[and] fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; [and] that
any more extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to
do certain things.” 218 In both Deshaney and Castle Rock, the Court
disregarded these underlying classical liberal ideals and instead based its
holding on what it believed was strict adherence to the positive/negative
rights dichotomy.
This flawed reasoning led to the untenable
comparison of the right to government protection of citizens and, for
example, the right of a citizen to be provided with welfare.
C.

Positive and Negative Rights

Negative rights “are rights that require others to refrain from certain
kinds of actions.” 219 These rights include the right to one’s mind and
body, including the right to physical security, and traditionally include
the right to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and privacy. 220
Essentially, negative rights describe the right to be left alone. Positive
rights, on the other hand, “require others to perform certain actions.” 221

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 141 (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
Id. at 145 (quoting James Madison).
Id. at 146 (quoting James Wilson).
See, e.g., Oren, supra note 86.
THE LIBERTARIAN READER 422 (David Boaz ed., 1997).
Id. at 181.
DANIEL SHAPIRO, IS THE WELFARE STATE JUSTIFIED? 25 (2007).
Id. at 25-26.
Id.
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The general classical liberal view is that positive rights “arise from a
special relationship between the parties, such as contractual rights . . .
whereas negative rights are usually general or universal rights, rights
that all persons have.” 222 Because rights necessarily impose obligations
to respect those rights, libertarians typically agree that positive
obligations can only arise from consent of the parties. 223
Under this view, the Castle Rock opinion’s reasoning is invalid
based on the contractual relationship that exists between individuals and
the State. 224 There are, however, a few problems with this argument.
First, the concept of the “social contract” is admittedly abstract and
would likely be impossible to conform to existing contract doctrine. 225
For example, how does the social contract fit into the traditional offerand-acceptance paradigm?
Citizens’ relationship with the government differs from a
contractual one in another fundamental way, although this may be more
of an argument in favor of citizens’ right to protection: a citizen cannot
breach the social contract by deciding to forego government benefits in
order to avoid paying taxes. 226 This is one of the major reasons the idea
of “consent” as a justification for government has been questioned. 227
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to fully analyze the nature
of the “consent of the governed,” it does seem fair to presume the
existence of consent because consent was used as the justification for the
creation of our government. 228
Alternatively, given the Court’s heavy emphasis on reliance in its
entitlement jurisprudence, 229 a promissory estoppel-based theory could
222. Id.
223. THE LIBERTARIAN READER, supra note 219, at 437.
224. DeShaney should also be rendered invalid under this analysis. By basing the right of
police protection on the consent of the governed, police protection could be viewed as a substantive
or procedural due process right. Categorically, it could not be denied because it is the foundation of
the government’s grant of power from the people. That being said, it certainly could not be
abridged without due process of law under the procedural prong of the Due Process Clause.
225. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 11–31 (2004) (exploring
the idea of the consent of the governed through several traditional justifications and ultimately
rejecting “actual” consent).
226. “[A]nyone who persists in thinking of taxation as in some sense a ‘voluntary’ payment
can see what happens if he chooses not to pay.” ROTHBARD, supra note 4, at 62.
227. See BARNETT, supra note 225.
228. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We
the People of the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)). Other alternatives have been proposed as
justifications for continuing governance aside from actual consent. See BARNETT, supra note 225.
229. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 317-319; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (“To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire [and]
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
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also provide a framework for analysis. Citizens are not only induced to
rely on police protection for their safety, they are required to because of
the monopoly the State has on police protection. This analysis still
results in a contract in law, if not in fact.
Under a contracts-based analysis, the purpose of forming
government was to ensure the protection of our negative rights,
primarily our right to safety. Although not recognized in either case
discussed in this Article, the social contract itself provided the
justification for the right of citizens to be provided with protection.
Although a positive right, through the creation of government, citizens
implicitly consented to the provision of this right to one another, and the
government agreed to provide it.
D.

The Court’s Logical Flaw

If consent, even in an abstract form, is all it really takes to justify
positive rights as rights guaranteed by the Constitution, isn’t the entire
entitlement doctrine that Castle Rock outlined eviscerated? 230 And does
a State’s inaction, as described in DeShaney, constitute a violation of
due process in all circumstances? 231 Does this mean that the
Constitution does guarantee positive, as well as negative rights?
By analyzing police protection under the same framework as it
analyzed welfare rights, the Court certainly seemed to imply that this
would be the case if the framework under discussion here were adopted.
The Court, however, failed to make a fundamental distinction:
recognizing the difference between a right itself and the provision of that
right. 232 Similarly, in DeShaney’s substantive due process analysis, the
it.”).
230. Demonstrating an entitlement requires meeting several elements. For example, there
must be more than a unilateral expectation, and the benefit must be conferred on a specific class.
See discussion supra Section II.A. Under the “contract” analysis of the Constitution, are these
elements no longer needed?
231. For example, the dissenting justices in DeShaney noted that, although children had an
entitlement to public education that was created under state law, there was no fundamental right to
education. 489 U.S. at 207–08. The entitlement arose because the State had undertaken to provide
the service. Id.
232. In his concurring opinion in Castle Rock, Justice Souter discussed the Court’s
misconstrued view of the distinction, or in the Court’s opinion, the lack thereof, between the right
and the process of enforcement, saying:
There is no articulable distinction between the object of Gonzales’s asserted entitlement
and the process she desires in order to protect her entitlement; both amount to certain
steps to be taken by the police to protect her family and herself. Gonzales’s claim would
thus take us beyond Roth or any other recognized theory of Fourteenth Amendment due
process, by collapsing the distinction between property protected and the process that
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Court failed to make the same distinction.
Both Courts collapsed the right itself—here, a liberty or property
interest—with the provision of the right, i.e. police protection. The right
of personal security itself, whether characterized as a property or liberty
interest, is a negative right. 233 Having the government provide it is a
positive right. This is drastically different than the other cases the
Courts cited. The right to receive welfare benefits is a positive right; the
right to be provided with welfare is also a positive right. The right to
receive an education is a positive right; the right to be provided with
education is also positive right. The same goes for disability benefits,
public utilities, and government employment. Because most “rights” the
Court has wrestled with in developing its due process jurisprudence have
been positive right/positive provision, it is easy to see why the Court
failed to recognize the unique status of police protection.
V. CONCLUSION
With the nature of police protection distinguished as being both the
motivation for the creation of government in the first place and as having
a unique status apart from other rights, the intuitive belief of many
people that DeShaney and Castle Rock do not comport with justice or
common understanding of government’s purpose is explained. Not only
does this framework provide a justification for overruling these cases
confined to their specific fact patterns, but it also justifies the right to
government protection of citizens’ security generally. Furthermore, the
justification is derived from the classical liberal principles on which this
country was founded. The extension of this right to all citizens should
not open the floodgates to all manner of entitlement claims because of
the unique nature of personal safety as a negative right ensured by a
positive right, and not a positive right ensured by a positive provision as
so many other recognized rights are.
For this doctrine to apply in practice, there would certainly need to
be significant constraints imposed. After all, practically, police cannot
be everywhere at once and are not mind-readers. Some police discretion
must remain in place. But in egregious cases like those examined in this
article, there is justification for the imposition of liability for failure to
protects it . . . .
Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 772. The distinction Justice Souter is referring to is different than the
right-provision distinction. His argument was that the entitlement Mrs. Gonzales claimed was itself
a process, not, as this Article claims, that the right and the provision of the right by the State were
the same thing.
233. SHAPIRO, supra note 217.
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ensure citizens’ safety.
With a right to police protection to citizens generally established,
the special relationship and special danger tests have a new context.
Seen in this light, they can be viewed as constraints on individuals’ right
to police protection, not as extensions of the right. By applying these
tests in this new context, excessive claims can be weeded out to prevent
a rush to the courts for suits over any injury that police failed to prevent.
Under the special relationship test, liability would not arise unless and
until police undertake to assist an individual. From that point, police
would be liable not for legitimate judgment calls in the line of duty but
for the types of dereliction of duty that occurred in DeShaney and Castle
Rock. An ideal solution would also incorporate the special danger test.
When government officials are notified of a danger to an individual,
such as when Mrs. Gonzales called police to report her children missing,
the officials would be obligated to investigate the situation. Discretion
in terms of how the investigation is carried out is necessary and
valuable, but officials would be held liable for totally failing to act. A
foreseeability and directness requirement, like the Third Circuit has
adopted with its state-created danger test, would also be desirable.
Hyperbolic assertions aside, acknowledging this right would not open
the doors of the courts to endless litigation or stretch law enforcement
offices to a breaking point. Incorporating the special relationship test,
the special danger test, and a foreseeability (or proximate cause)
requirement would greatly reduce frivolous claims.
Protection is not a government-provided luxury or favor. It is
deeper even than a constitutional right; it is a right derived from the
ultimate purpose of creating a government. It is little wonder that the
Court’s jurisprudence on the right to police protection has struck so
many citizens as inherently wrong. The Court’s first premise is wrong.
In fact, it is completely backward. The Court begins with the
presumption that the right to protection does not exist. Only when this
fallacy is corrected can the Court begin to build a fair and logical
doctrine to displace the DeShaney and Castle Rock mistake.

